About Us
Information
Steps To Apply
Forms
The Law
The Act and Regulations
Rules of Practice
Interpretation Guidelines
Selected Decisions
Redacted Orders
Online Services
|
Selected Decisions (August 31, 2008 to June 30,2009)Below you will find summaries of the Board’s Selected Decisions. To view the full-text of a decision click on the "full-text The full-text versions of the Selected Decisions are posted in the language in which they were issued. Most of the Board’s hearings are held in English so the majority of the Board’s decisions are issued in English only. However, if a bilingual hearing is held, the Board issues the decision in both English and French. To satisfy the requirements of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, the names of parties and witnesses and the address of the rental unit have been removed.
Note: The Board disclaims responsibility for the accuracy of the summaries of the Selected Decisions and for any consequences resulting from a person relying on the Selected Decisions provided by the Board. PDF Printer-friendly version of Summaries (
The Landlord had giv en the Tenant notice that the Landlord intended to enter into the Tenant’s rental unit between the hours of 11 a.m. and 8 p.m. to inspect the rental unit to determine if it was in a good state of repair and fit for habitation. The Tenant refused entry to the Landlord. The Landlord also claimed that the Tenant had installed a form of pad lock on a chain which, in an emergency, would block the Landlord from having access to the rental unit. The Landlord did not have a key to the pad lock and had not authorized its use by the Tenant. The Member dismissed the application relating to the issue of entry into the rental unit on the basis that the notice of entry did not comply with subsection 27 (3) of the RTA as it did not specify a time of entry within the twelve hour window (8 a.m. to 8 p.m.) set out in that provision of the RTA. The Member found that the Landlord did not have to be as specific as to set out the exact hour and minute of entry, but that a nine hour period does not comply with the RTA. The Member found that the intent of section 35 of the Act is to ensure that a landlord has access to a rental unit in an emergency and ordered the Tenant to provide the Landlord with a key to the door and locking mechanism. full-text (eng)
Pursuant to the Mortgages Act a mortgagee in possession is deemed to be the Landlord. The Tenant had voluntarily prepaid rent to the prior Landlord. The Tenancy Agreement between the Tenant and the prior Landlord did not contain a term providing for prepaid rent in an amount greater than one month’s rent. The prepayment of rent occurred after the Tenancy Agreement had been entered into between the prior Landlord and the Tenant.
The Landlord applied to evict the Tenant for persistent late payment of rent. The Landlord also requested that, as a condition of relief from eviction, the Member order the Tenant to pay rent arrears under s. 204(1) of the RTA. That section allows the Board to include in an order whatever conditions it considers fair in the circumstances. The Member made a conditional order pursuant to s. 83 and 204(1) which required the Tenant to pay the rent on time for the next twelve months, and allowed the Landlord to apply under s. 78 if the Tenant failed to make any of those payments. The Member refused to order arrears under s. 204(1) because doing so would effectively convert the L2 application into an L1 application. For an L1, an N4 notice must be served and the Tenant has the opportunity to void that notice. If the notice is not voided, the Landlord can file an L1 application for arrears. Ordering arrears on an L2 would circumvent that entire process. Moreover, a conditional order under s. 78 would not give the Landlord a remedy. Under s. 78, the conditions imposed must give rise to the same grounds of termination as were claimed in the original application. The Landlord’s L2 application sought termination for persistent late rent, not arrears of rent, and therefore the Landlord would be left without a remedy if the rent arrears were not paid. full-text (eng)
The tenancy commenced in 1993. Electricity was included in the monthly rent. In June 2008, the Landlord wrote to the Tenant to inform him that Stratacon had been chosen to provide electricity sub-meters and billing services for electricity consumption each suite in the building. The Landlord advised that once sub-meters were installed, the Tenant would be responsible for paying his own electricity consumption directly to Stratacon and the rent would be reduced. In August 2008, the Landlord advised the Tenant that the sub-meters were installed and the Tenant’s rent would be reduced by $32.16 per month. In September 2008, the Tenant advised the Landlord that the Tenant objected to the rent reduction and the change in the way electricity is paid.
The tenancy commenced in 2005. Electricity was included in the monthly rent.
The Landlord sought termination of the tenancy and eviction on the basis that the Tenant parked his motorcycle in the rental unit, kept live chickens at the rental unit and modified the shed on the property to house live chickens. The Tenant agreed that he had three live chickens on the property that he kept in the shed and that he removed a brick from the shed to provide access to his chickens. The Tenant acknowledged that he once had a young chicken inside the rental unit but that chicken had died and submitted that the alleged motorcycle was, in fact, an electric bike that he kept in the rental unit because of his concerns about theft. The Member, in dismissing the application, found that, to succeed in an application based on clause 63 (1)(b) of the RTA, the Landlord was required to prove (i) that the use of the rental unit was inconsistent with its use as residential premises, (ii) that the inconsistent use can be reasonably expected to cause damage or has caused damage and, (iii) that the amount of the damage is significantly greater than the amount that would be required to give the Tenant a Notice to Terminate the tenancy for damage under subsection 62 (1) or clause 63 (1)(a) of the RTA. In this case, the Member found that the damage occasioned by the removal of a brick in the shed did not meet the third part of the test and the inconsistent use of the rental unit relating to the storage of the motorcycle or electric bike did not occasion damage.
The Tenant claimed to have been an employee of the Landlord and that, as an employee, his tenancy could only be terminated in accordance with paragraph 3 of subsection 58 (1) of the RTA, that is, on 60 days’ notice. The Tenant argued that he worked only a few hours a day doing work at more than one location and, therefore, he was an employee, not a superintendent. The Tenant also argued that the manner in which he was paid indicated he was an employee and not a superintendent. The Member found that the locations at which the Tenant worked were a related group of buildings forming one residential complex and that the majority of the Tenant’s work related to that residential complex. The Member also found that the manner in which the Tenant was paid (the hours of work were accumulated at a specific rate per hour and rent deducted from the gross pay) is not uncommon in the case of a superintendent. The Member found that the Tenant’s job description was more that of a janitor than a superintendent, and, in applying the definition of “superintendent’s premises” in the RTA, which means, in the relevant part, “a rental unit used by a person employed as a janitor…” the Member found that the Tenant occupied a superintendent’s premises and sections 93 and 94 of the RTA applied to the termination of the tenancy.
The Tenant had succeeded on his application for an order that the Landlord had entered the rental unit illegally, had altered the locking system without giving the Tenant replacement keys and had substantially interfered with the Tenant’s reasonable enjoyment. The Tenant requested a review on the basis that the hearing Member had not given adequate reasons to support the quantum of compensation the Member had ordered. The Tenant had asked for an award of $2,100.00 and the Member had awarded the Tenant $500.00. The Member who conducted the review hearing granted the Tenant’s request for review on the basis that the hearing Member had not given adequate reasons to support the quantum of compensation and also granted the Landlord’s request that the review hearing proceed de novo and not be limited to the issue of the quantum of the award.
The Tenants of a mobile home park applied for an order determining that the Landlord had substantially interfered with their reasonable enjoyment. The Tenants’ complaint was that the Landlord is imposing rules that restrict what the Tenants are allowed to have on their sites such as boats, trailers and other vehicles. The Member determined that the Landlord has the right to make such rules under s. 154 of the RTA, but set out the following principles gleaned from court decisions on the rule-making power of condominiums: the rules should be reasonable; the rules must not be contrary to the legislative scheme; the courts should not substitute their opinion for that of the rule maker unless the rules are unreasonable. The Tenants’ application was dismissed. full-text (eng)
The applicant applied for an order determining whether the RTA applies to the slip where he keeps his boat at the respondent’s Marina. The boat has two sleeping rooms, a kitchen, bathroom and shower. As well, the applicant has erected extensive decking, a gazebo and storage shed. He has rented the same slip for six years and spends a lot of time there from April to October each year. He moves the boat to a different location for winter storage and then brings it back to the Marina in the spring. The Member determined that the RTA does not apply because of the exemption in s. 5(a) which states that the Act does not apply to living accommodation occupied for a seasonal or temporary period. full-text (eng)
The Landlords had filed an application with the Board seeking termination of the tenancy and eviction on the basis of arrears of rent. The application was filed two weeks before the Tenant filed an assignment in bankruptcy and was scheduled to be heard one day after the filing of that assignment. On the hearing date, the Landlord and Tenant entered into a mediated settlement that encompassed the period of three months before the assignment into bankruptcy and one month after it and provided for payment of the arrears. Four weeks after the date of the mediated settlement, the Landlords filed a proof of claim in the bankruptcy. Later, the Landlords, pursuant to section 78 of the RTA, obtained an ex parte order for arrears and for termination and eviction from the Board which the Tenant moved to set aside. The issue before the Board on the return of the Tenant’s motion was whether the Board had the jurisdiction to make the order terminating the tenancy and evicting the Tenant. In setting aside the order the Landlord’s had obtained ex parte, the Member considered and applied the Divisional Court’s decisions in Forestwood Co-operative Homes Inc. v. Pritz and in Peel Housing Corporation v. Siewnarine, and found that the case before her was consistent with Forestwood insofar as the Landlords had applied for both arrears and termination of the tenancy in the same application to the Board and the termination and arrears were inextricably linked and formed part of a claim provable in bankruptcy. The Member found that all amounts claimed in the Landlord’s original application before the Board were stayed by virtue of the bankruptcy and that any new arrears that may have arisen subsequent to the period provided for in the mediated settlement could possibly be sought by the Landlords in a new proceeding. full-text (eng)
The Landlord applied for an order permitting an above guideline increase. The Member found that the Landlord had justified an above guideline increase because of capital expenditures in relation to window replacement and renovations in the common areas of the buildings. Single pane-windows which had outlived their useful life were replaced with double-glazed aluminium windows in all the rental units. The Member found that the window replacement was an eligible capital expenditure. The Landlord made a number of common area renovations to the main lobby, hallways, the laundry room and elevators, including, replacement of the flooring, change of the lighting, merging a cleaning supply room and old mail room to create a social room for the Tenants, replacement of carpeting in the corridors and replacement of the flooring and interior skin in the elevators. The Tenants contended that the common area renovation work was substantially cosmetic in nature, designed to enhance the level of prestige or luxury in the building and did not meet the definition of “capital expenditure” in s. 18 (1) of O. Reg. 516/06. The Tenants particularly contested the eligibility of the expenditure related to the social room. The Member found that the Landlord did not establish, on a balance of probabilities, that the social room met any of the eligibility tests in s. 126 (7) of the RTA or any of the exceptions in s. 126 (8) of the RTA. The Member severed the expense for the social room from the balance of the Landlord’s claim. The Member allowed the balance of the claim relating to the common area expenses and found that, although there is a cosmetic aspect to any new installation, the renovations were not substantially cosmetic in this case. The Member also found that the RTA does not permit the Board to consider the potential tax deductions the Landlord may be able to take for capital expenditures that are incurred and also found that the ordinary guideline increase is designed to take into account increases in a landlord’s building maintenance and operating costs, but not extraordinary expenses such as eligible capital expenditures.
A previous Board order determined there was no tenancy between the Landlord RW and the Tenant because their relationship was spousal. RW later transferred the property to his father, BW. BW applied for an order for arrears and termination. The Member observed that a tenancy agreement continues when a new owner purchases the rental unit, and the existing tenant and the successor landlord continue to be bound the tenancy agreement. However, when there is no tenancy agreement in the first place, as determined in the previous order, there is nothing to transfer. In order for a Landlord and Tenant relationship to exist, the parties would have to establish a tenancy agreement for the period of time under consideration in the application. The Landlord failed to prove such an agreement, and the application was dismissed.
SWT-02253 22/05/2009
The Tenant applied for an order determining that he was entitled to compensation of three months rent because he vacated after receiving the Landlord’s notice of termination for renovations. The Landlord argued that the Tenant had been offered another rental unit which the Tenant refused and therefore was not entitled to compensation. The Tenant refused the Landlord’s offer because although there were other units that had a similar layout to his, none of them had the same location which was also important to the Tenant. Pursuant to s. 54(1), the Member determined that the rental unit must be “acceptable to the tenant.” It follows that the test as to whether or not the unit is “acceptable” is a subjective one. The Landlord was ordered to compensate the Tenant the equivalent of three months rent.
TEL-12889 31/10/2008
The Tenant was a long time resident in a residential complex in which the Landlord was a community housing provider. The Tenant was a tenant representative and a volunteer for building and community activities. Along with other tenant volunteers, the Tenant was given access to a computer in the Landlord’s on site office. The Tenant also had a computer on loan in his rental unit.
The Landlord was a social housing provider that operated separate townhouse complexes on different streets a short distance from each other in the same municipality. The complexes were separated from each other by a park and a school. The Tenant’s teenage son was observed by the police in the laundry room area of the residential complex where the Tenant lived. The officers pursued the Tenant’s son to the second residential complex and the officers charged the Tenant’s son with forcible confinement in relation to an incident that allegedly occurred at the second residential complex. As a result of that incident, the Landlord sought to terminate the tenancy on the basis that an illegal act had occurred at the Tenant’s residential complex. The Member, in dismissing the application, considered the definition of “residential complex” and found that “related group of buildings” means “geographically related in terms of…being in one adjoining area”. In this case, the Member found that the buildings were not adjoining, but were located on separate streets, interrupted by a park and other un-related structures not owned by the Landlord and did not share common facilities. full-text (eng)
The Tenant had made a series of payments in May 2008 that totalled all the rent in arrears, the additional rent due under the tenancy agreement as of the date of payment, and the Landlord’s application fee. The Landlord submitted that the application was not discontinued as the Tenant had not paid rent for the month of June 2008 and that sum became due and payable before the hearing date. The Member, in dismissing the Landlord’s application, found that the fact that the June rent became due and payable after the date of payment of all amounts set out in subsection 74 (2) of the RTA was immaterial for the purposes of that provision of the RTA. ful-text (eng)
The application was heard on September 17, 2008. The mortgagee in possession had been in possession since June 2008 but did not have a copy of the tenancy agreement and had been unable to obtain particulars relating to the tenancies from the prior Landlord (the mortgagor) or from the Tenants. The mortgagee in possession determined that, for the purposes of calculating the arrears of rent in the Notice to End a Tenancy Early for Nonpayment of Rent, its application to the Board would claim a monthly rent in an amount sufficient to satisfy the monthly mortgage payments. In dismissing the application, the Member found that, in a case where the prior Landlord and the Tenants were unwilling to provide particulars of the tenancy agreement, including the monthly rent, the current Landlord must first pursue its rights under section 50 of the Mortgages Act to obtain an order from the Superior Court requiring disclosure. The Member found that the current Landlord could not in good faith claim that the Board must accept its arbitrary determination of the monthly rent simply because the current Landlord has been unable to obtain particulars from the prior Landlord or from the Tenants.
full-text (eng)
In February 2006 the parties signed a tenancy agreement where the Tenants were ordinary tenants. Around the same time, the Landlord wanted to find a superintendent for the residential complex. In March 2006, the Landlord and the male Tenant (the “Tenant”) executed a “Superintendent Contract” which specified the superintendent’s responsibilities. The Tenants were not required to pay rent or utilities and the Landlord refunded the last month’s rent to them. The Tenant was also paid a salary. In January 2007, the Tenant and the Landlord executed a document entitled, “Annex to Employment Contract” which, among other matters, provided that the “Superintendent’s Contract” would be terminated, the Tenant would not receive a salary, that the Tenant would perform certain duties, including cleaning, snow and garbage removal, and, would continue to live in the same rental unit but not pay rent, utilities or parking. In February 2007, the Landlord posted a notice to the tenants of the residential complex that the Tenant was no longer the “live-in superintendent”, and, that maintenance requests were to be directed to the main office phone number. In August 2008, the Landlord wrote to the Tenant and advised that his services were terminated and he was required to vacate the unit. The Member considered whether, by executing the Annex, the parties had altered the fundamental nature of their relationship. The Member found that the fact that the Tenants occupied a unit historically occupied by the superintendent is only one factor to consider but that it was not determinative of what constitutes a “superintendent’s premises”. The Member, in dismissing the Landlord’s application, found that the terms used in the two agreements (Superintendent Contract and Annex) between the parties were to be given their ordinary meaning, and that any ambiguity was to be construed against the author of the agreements, that is, the Landlord. In this case, upon the execution of the Annex, the Tenant ceased to be “employed” by the Landlord and the rental unit no longer met the definition of a “superintendent’s premises”. full-text (eng)
TEL-19970-RV 26/03/2009
The Tenants did not attend the original hearing as their disabled daughter’s school bus was late due to weather and road conditions on the morning of the hearing. The Member found that the Tenants were not reasonably able to participate in that hearing and the Member allowed the Tenants’ request for review and held a hearing.
The Landlord obtained an ex parte order terminating the tenancy and evicting the Tenant because the Tenant had failed to meet a condition specified in a settlement mediated by the Board. The Tenant was granted an extension of time to file a motion to set aside the ex parte order.
The residential complex, designated as an adult “50 plus” community consisted of 82 rental units. The Tenant moved into the rental unit in January, 2009 and in March, 2009, the police executed a search warrant at the Tenant’s rental unit and found crack cocaine, drug paraphernalia and money at the unit. During the execution of the search warrant, an individual in the Tenant’s unit jumped from the unit to the balcony below, went through the unit of the tenant below and broke a door frame in that unit. The Tenant, the person who fled, and, another person in the unit at the time of the search were arrested and charged with possession of a controlled substance for the purpose of trafficking in it. TEL-23178 14/05/2009
The Landlord served the Tenant with a Notice of Termination and the Landlord’s application for termination and eviction by sending both to the Tenant by registered mail. The Notice of Termination was returned to the Landlord as unclaimed by the Tenant. Neither the application of the Notice of Hearing had been signed for by the Tenant and only the Landlord attended the hearing.
The Tenant vacated the rental unit on October 3, 2008 after the Landlord had given the Tenant a Notice to Terminate with a termination date of August 29, 2008. The Board’s hearing was held on October 7, 2008. The Landlord submitted that the Tenant did not vacate the rental unit in compliance with the Notice and further submitted that the Board should issue an order determining that the tenancy ended on October 31, 2008 as that date was a date earlier than the Tenant could have been deemed to have given notice pursuant to section 88 of the RTA.
The Landlord intended to convert the rental unit to a non-residential use. The residential complex was a house in the High Park area of Toronto and part of a parcel of land the Landlord had assembled for redevelopment on which 12 vacant homes plus the subject property are situated. At the time of the Landlord’s application to the Board, the issue of a demolition permit from the City of Toronto was the subject of not yet concluded proceedings at the Ontario Municipal Board (the “OMB”). Pending a determination by the OMB of the demolition issue, the Landlord wanted to convert the Tenant’s home to a non-residential use, namely vacant property.
The Member found that the RTA does not require that a residential complex be decrepit in order to justify converting it to a vacant closed property. The Member also found that, while a landlord may make a business decision to convert a property to non-use, the circumstances of the conversion are relevant in a determination by the Board of its discretion to delay or deny an eviction.
During his tenancy, the Tenant erected a shed on the residential complex in a manner that, as disclosed in a survey of the properties, encroached onto the property of the next door neighbour. The Tenant also parked his car in a manner that blocked the neighbour’s side of the mutual driveway. The Tenant ignored demands that he cease parking in that manner and that he remove the shed. The Tenant argued that the Notice of Termination was void because it did not provide sufficient particulars of the conduct about which the Landlord complained. The Member found that the Notice was valid as it put the Tenant on notice of the case that was required to be met. The Tenant argued that he had built the shed with the consent of the previous owners of both properties. The Member found that the Tenant had blocked the neighbour’s access to the mutual driveway and that the Tenant’s refusal to remove the shed exposed the Landlord to potential litigation by the neighbouring property owner. The Tenant’s conduct substantially interfered with the Landlord’s reasonable enjoyment of the residential complex and substantially interfered with the Landlord’s lawful right, privilege or interest. The Member ordered termination and eviction. In applying section 83 of the RTA, the Member found that the relationship between the Landlord and the Tenant was beyond repair. The Member delayed the eviction in view of the impending holidays and to give the Tenant time to remove the shed and clear his contents from the garage. The Member ordered the Tenant to pay $500.00 in costs to the Board for the Tenant’s having acted improperly and unreasonably in the proceedings, including challenging rulings after they were made, failing to follow the Member’s directions and continuing to pursue matters the Member had ruled were irrelevant. full-text (eng)
The Tenants filed a motion to set aside the Board’s order terminating the tenancy and evicting the Tenants. The Tenants submitted that the order was void as the Tenants had paid the amounts required under subsection 74 (11) of the RTA to void the order. The Landlord submitted that the Tenant’s motion should be dismissed as, while the Tenants had paid all the amounts required to be paid under subsection 74 (11) of the RTA to void the order, the Tenants had paid those amounts directly to the Landlord and not to the Board. The Member dismissed the application and found that the Legislature’s intent was to give tenants an opportunity to void an order after it becomes enforceable and that the requirement to pay to the Board was to provide clear proof of payment. The Member found that where, as in this case, there is clear proof of payment to the Landlord, it would defeat the intent of the legislation to allow the Landlord to proceed with the eviction even though the arrears were paid and the Landlord received those sums earlier than it would have if the Tenants had paid the money to the Board.
The Landlord had purchased the residential complex in 1994. The Tenant had lived in the rental unit since 1991 and is the son of the developer of the residential complex. The Occupants are the sister of the Tenant and her spouse. After purchasing the building, the Landlord discovered that the Tenant had a lease that provided for rent for the rental unit and two parking spaces of $214.00 per month, a rent far below market value. At the time of the Landlord’s application, the rent was $354.35 a month, also far below market value. In 2002, the Landlord changed access to the residential complex from key access to fob access and asked the tenants how many fobs and cards would be required by each tenant. The Landlord, when it inquired of the tenants who would need key fobs for the new locking system, discovered that the Tenant’s sister was an occupant of the rental unit as the Tenant had asked for cards for himself and for his sister whom he listed as an occupant. In the spring of 2002, the Landlord applied to the Ontario Rental Housing Tribunal for an order for termination of the tenancy on the basis that the Tenant had transferred occupancy to his sister and had abandoned the rental unit. The Tribunal dismissed the application and, in terms of the improper transfer of tenancy application, the Tribunal found that it had no jurisdiction to consider it because it was filed more than 60 days after the Landlord discovered the unauthorized occupant. In 2003, on an application by the Tenant that the Landlord had harassed him and had substantially interfered with him, the Tribunal found for the Tenant and ordered the Landlord to provide a key fob for the sister’s use and a second parking space. In June 2008, the Tenant wrote the Landlord to advise that the Tenant had lost two pass cards and needed replacements. When the Tenant went to pick up the pass cards, the superintendent of his building was away and the Tenant had to go to the superintendent of the neighbouring building in the complex. At that time, the Tenant gave identification to the superintendent that disclosed a residence address for the Tenant other than at the rental unit. The Tenant had moved out of the building in 2004 but continued to use a parking space in the building as it was near his health club. The Member found that the Landlord first discovered the Tenant had moved out of the building in June and July of 2008 and the Landlord’s application was filed within sixty days of discovering the unauthorized occupancy as required by s. 100 (2) of the RTA. The Member found that the Tenant transferred occupancy of the rental unit in a manner other than by an assignment authorized by s. 95 of the RTA or a subletting authorized by s. 97 of the RTA. The Member found that, although the Tenant retained some connection to the rental unit by keeping some personal effects there and by parking there, he had moved out of the rental unit and had transferred occupancy of it in a manner other than as authorized by the RTA. The Member also found that the Landlord’s application was not barred by res judicata or through some other form of issue estoppel. The Member found that, in the earlier application dismissed by the Tribunal, the issue was whether or not the Tenant had moved out prior to the application being brought and had relinquished control to his sister. In this application, the issue was whether the Tenant had moved out after the first application and had left his sister in control of the rental unit. The fact that the Tenant had moved out in 2004 after the previous litigation was found to be a substantive and material change in circumstances. The Member found that the Tenant does not need the rental unit to have a home and declined to exercise her discretion to relieve against eviction. full-text (eng)
The residential complex housed persons who have mental illnesses. The Tenant, who had a disability because of mental illness, had assaulted other tenants in the residential complex.
The Landlord was a mortgagee in possession who had served the Tenant with a Notice of Attornment of Rents pursuant to the Mortgages Act. The Landlord had also demanded particulars from the Tenants relating to the tenancy, including the Tenants’ names, the amount of the monthly rent and the term of the tenancy agreement. The Tenants had not provided those particulars to the Landlord. TSL-87099-RV/TST-01120-RV 27/10/2008
The Tenant’s application for an order based upon the Landlord having failed to meet the Landlord’s maintenance obligations was filed in January 2008. The Member at the original hearing had allowed an abatement of rent for the period of January 2005 to July 2007. At the review hearing, the Landlord submitted that the Member at the original hearing should only have awarded remedies going back one year from the date on which the Tenant filed his application.
The Landlord had served two Notices of Termination on the Tenant alleging substantial interference; the first notice was served on October 6, 2008 with a termination date of November 4, 2008 and the second notice was served on December 5, 2008 with a termination date of January 4, 2009. In September 2008, the police, proceeding with a search warrant, had entered the Tenant’s rental unit. The first Notice of Termination set out two grounds, that the Tenants and her guests were interfering with others in the common areas of the buildings and that the actions of the Tenant and her guests led to the police attending. The second Notice of Termination referred to the damage caused to the door of the rental unit when the police broke in to that unit. Having found that the Tenant had voided the first notice and that the second notice contained no reference to that conduct having continued, the Member dismissed the Landlord’s application. The only difference between the first and second notice was the inclusion of an amount the Landlord sought for the broken door. The Member found that the second notice was invalid as it did not describe anything new occurring in the interim. The Member also found that, as the only valid notice was the first, and, as the application was not filed until February 2, 2009, it was filed too late and was void. The Member found that the damage was caused by the police and not by the Tenant or her guests and subsection 89 (1) of the RTA does not allow for vicarious liability in these types of circumstances. full-text (eng)
TSL-24659 02/07/2009
The Landlord applied to evict the Tenant because her employment as superintendent had ended. The Tenant was hired as an administrative assistant in 2005. She was not required to live in the Landlord’s residential complex and did not live there. In 2006 she was given the position of reservations manager and later that year moved into the residential complex. Although she lived there she actually worked at the Landlord’s office located nearby. The Landlord failed to establish that the Tenant occupied the unit as a condition of being the reservations manager. The Member determined that a residential tenancy exists and this tenancy is not dependent on the Tenant’s employment with the Landlord. The Landlord’s application was dismissed. The Member further determined that even if he had found the rental unit to be superintendent’s premises, he would have denied the eviction under s. 83 of the RTA because the Landlord already has a live-in superintendent and does not require the rental unit for a new manager. full-text
eng)
The Tenant had resided at the rental unit for nearly 25 years and had a good relationship with “Landlord 1” who operated a business on the main floor below the rental unit. The Tenant vacated the unit after having received a second Notice of Termination from Landlord 1 for the purchaser’s (Landlord 2) own use. The Tenant claimed that he became aware that no one had moved into the rental unit within a reasonable period after he had moved. Landlord 1 testified that he relied on the real estate agent retained by both Landlords 1 and 2 who had told Landlord 1 that Landlord 2 required vacant possession of the entire building and that Landlord 2 intended to live in the rental unit. Although Landlord 2 did not want to be a party to the former Tenant’s application, the Member found that it was appropriate that Landlord 2 be added as a party as the definition of “Landlord” in section 2 of the RTA includes successors in title. Landlord 2 testified that she had not told the real estate agent that she required vacant possession of the rental unit and that she had no contact with Landlord 1 throughout the purchase and sale of the property. The Member, in applying clause 57 (1)(b) of the RTA found that Landlord 1 relied on the agent’s assurances about the intention of Landlord 2 to occupy the rental unit, and also found that Landlord 2 had never indicated that she intended to occupy the rental unit. The Member found that “bad faith” is “not “simply bad judgment or negligence, but rather it implies the conscious doing of a wrong because of a dishonest purpose…” and further found that the fact that Landlord 2 did not move in did not, on its own, demonstrate bad faith. The Member dismissed the former Tenant’s application. The Member found that, if anyone was at fault, it was the real estate agent, and, that neither Landlord 1 nor Landlord 2 had acted in bad faith. full-text (eng)
|
||
Contact the Landlord and Tenant Board © Queen's Printer for Ontario, 2007 - Last Modified: March 08, 2010 This information is provided as a public service. Although we endeavor to ensure that the information is as current and accurate as possible, errors do occasionally occur. Therefore, we cannot guarantee the accuracy of the information. Readers should where possible verify the information before acting on it. |
|||